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Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders
Using a Geographic Instrument
Bo Becker, Henrik Cronqvist, and Ru¨diger Fahlenbrach∗
Abstract
Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but iden-
tifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures.
We develop and test an empirical framework that allows us to separate selection from treat-
ment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public
firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical observation, we develop an
instrument (the density of wealthy individuals near a firm’s headquarters) for the presence
of large, nonmanagerial individual shareholders in firms. These shareholders have a large
impact on firms, controlling for selection effects.
I. Introduction
A public firm’s shareholders have extensive legal control rights in the corpo-
ration, but in practice much of this control is delegated to managers. In companies
with small, dispersed shareholders, owners may find it costly to coordinate and
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exercise monitoring and control, leaving management with considerable discre-
tion. The resulting agency problems between owners and managers may be severe
(e.g., Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976)).1 By concentrating
a block of shares in the hands of a single decision maker, large shareholders may
play a beneficial role in remedying these agency problems and facilitating effec-
tive owner control (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).
A large shareholder may restrain managers from extracting rents and thereby im-
prove firm performance, benefiting all shareholders. Other theories predict that a
block in a firm may be costly. Large shareholders may, for example, reduce the
liquidity of a firm’s shares (because they make asymmetric information problems
more severe) or influence firm policies in some way that is not in the interest of
small shareholders (e.g., favoring tax-inefficient forms of cash distribution).
Testing these theories regarding the effects of large owners is challenging.
Researchers in corporate finance have recognized for more than 20 years (at least
since Demsetz and Lehn (1985)) the difficulty of causal inference in studies of
ownership and performance. Suppose, for example, that blockholders systemat-
ically target firms with poor performance because of the potential performance
increases due to improved monitoring, or that they select more liquid stocks be-
cause of the relatively lower cost of creating a block. Suppose also, as predicted
by theory, that conditional on such selection, blockholder monitoring improves
operating profitability and reduces the liquidity of the firm’s shares. If this is the
case, then ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of performance or stock liq-
uidity on block presence in a firm confound selection effects and treatment effects
of block ownership. In this paper, we develop and test a new instrumental vari-
able (IV) framework that allows us to separate these effects for a large group of
blockholders. This allows us to quantify the impact of large owners on several key
aspects of firm behavior.
Our analysis focuses on individual nonmanagerial blockholders and excludes
blocks held by mutual funds and other institutions. This is motivated by the limi-
tations of our identification strategy (i.e., what our instrument predicts) but is also
appealing when testing predictions from theories of large shareholders. Nonman-
agement individuals who hold a large block of shares in a firm seem to fit naturally
with the notion of having a principal present in the firm because they are gener-
ally less constrained than institutional investors from being active monitors of
management. They do not face the regulatory constraints of many mutual funds
and pension funds (e.g., Black (1990), Roe (1990)), they are not afraid of los-
ing money management business (e.g., Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Davis
and Kim (2007)), and they come with fewer agency problems of their own (e.g.,
Diamond (1984)).2 Managers who are also blockholders have interests that may
1There is a large literature on manager-shareholder conflicts. Demsetz (1983) argues that a man-
ager may extract nonpecuniary benefits to the detriment of shareholders. Jensen (1986), (1989) argues
that managers expropriate small, dispersed shareholders by diverting corporate resources for empire
building or perk consumption.
2While institutions are not generally active owners, some institutions are more active than others.
There is evidence from the 1980s and early 1990s that some public pension funds, for example, the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), were active in corporate governance
(e.g., Smith (1996), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)). Also, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008)
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differ dramatically from those of other owners (see, e.g., Barclay and Holderness
(1989)). Thus, nonmanagement individual blockholders appear to fit well with
theories of outside monitors.
Our instrument for the presence of a large shareholder in a firm is the number
of high net worth individuals in the state where a firm is headquartered divided by
the number of public firms headquartered in the state, which we refer to as wealth
density.3 This variable is a valid instrument for the presence of blocks in local
firms if it is correlated with the frequency of such blocks (relevancy condition)
but affects the dependent variables only through its effect on block ownership
(exclusion restriction). Our instrument reflects economic forces that are important
for the presence of a block in a firm. The relevancy condition is easiest to evaluate.
First, blockholders exhibit a preference for firms headquartered near where they
live, presumably because of lower monitoring costs or asymmetric information.4
The median distance between a nonmanagerial individual blockholder and the
firm in which they have a block is 28.5 miles. Second, personal wealth is likely
a determinant of an individual’s ability to invest a large stake in a public firm.
Finally, there is significant cross-state variation in the wealth density instrument,
possibly reflecting exogenously attractive areas or the fact that wealthy people
prefer to live near other wealthy individuals because of social reasons or similar
tastes (e.g., Glaeser (1998)). We find that our instrument predicts the presence
of a block in a firm with considerable power. The economic magnitude of the
estimated effect is large: Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of wealth
density increases the predicted probability of a block in a local firm from 8.7% to
12.8% (i.e., it increases the probability by about 50%).
While there is no statistical test of the validity of the exclusion restriction
in the presence of a single instrument, we provide several empirical observations
and arguments to support its validity. First, our instrument comes from inheritance
data, that is, deceased wealthy individuals, so it reflects “old money,” limiting the
impact of local wealth-creating events such as initial public offerings of local
firms, which may directly affect current firm performance and policies. Second, if
wealth density was correlated with firm-specific variables measuring the demand
for a block in a firm, we would also expect it to predict the presence of blocks
other than nonmanagerial individual blocks. We find that wealth density does not
predict the presence of blocks by managers or institutional investors. We return to
a more detailed discussion of the validity of our instrument in Section IV.D.
Our empirical evidence is consistent with theories of large shareholders as
monitors of management. We find that blocks are not randomly allocated to firms,
but large shareholders systematically target firms based on where the benefits
from additional monitoring are expected to be more significant (e.g., smaller and
relatively poorly performing firms). Controlling for such block selection, we find
that the presence of a large shareholder significantly reduces a firm’s investments,
and Clifford (2008) compare firms before and after an activist hedge fund accumulates a stake and find
significant changes in performance and firm policies.
3To the best of our knowledge, no database available reliably captures U.S. wealth distribution on
a scale finer than state level (e.g., metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)).
4See Lerner (1995) for evidence on local bias among venture capitalists, Coval and Moskowitz
(1999), (2001) for mutual funds, and Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2008) for retail investors.
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reduces corporate cash holdings, increases payouts to shareholders, reduces total
top-executive pay, and increases firm performance. Firms with blockholders also
have significantly more outside directors on their boards. In addition to monitor-
ing benefits, we also find that block presence comes with some costs. One such
cost is less liquid publicly traded shares. This may reflect a smaller float as well
as the presence of privately informed traders (i.e., the blockholders).
Our paper contributes to existing research on large shareholders’ impact on
firms by explicitly addressing the endogeneity of the ownership structure. In his
survey, Holderness (2003) emphasizes endogeneity problems in analyzing block
ownership and concludes that “[s]urprisingly few major corporate decisions have
been shown to be different in the presence of a blockholder” (p. 60). Controlling
for selection effects dramatically changes our inference about block impact on
firm behavior. We show that large shareholders indeed play a large role for cor-
porate governance in large public U.S. firms and can have large effects on several
firm policies. For example, large shareholders target firms with poor performance,
but conditional on doing so, they improve performance, consistent with monitor-
ing theories of blockholders. In addition to effects on performance, we test for a
large shareholder’s impact on corporate policies, many of which have not been
previously analyzed, and we find evidence consistent with blockholder monitor-
ing causing changes in these policies. On the other hand, capital structure does not
appear much affected by large shareholders. In general, our findings are consistent
with the interpretation that firms in areas with a relatively low supply of potential
blockholders display the characteristics of firms with more severe agency prob-
lems between owners and managers.
There are no clear policy implications of our findings. First, because large
shareholders and small shareholders do not necessarily have coinciding prefer-
ences about firm policy, changes that benefit one may not benefit the other. En-
couraging block formation may not be beneficial on net. Second, our results are
limited to noninstitutional outsiders, which are scarce and difficult to produce.
Blocks held by mutual funds and other institutions (which can more easily be
grown) may have a very different impact on firms. Finally, the potential impact of
a blockholder is likely different across different individuals and firms. The firms
where we observe blockholders are likely to be those where the potential benefits
are the largest.
The second contribution of our paper is to show that the local supply of po-
tential blockholders (i.e., the local supply of one potentially important governance
mechanism) in the area where a firm is headquartered may have significant effects
on firm behavior, that is, that geography matters for the ownership structure of
firms (see Coval and Moskowitz (1999) for related patterns for institutional stock
ownership). We use these patterns to empirically model the supply side of large
shareholders. This allows us to examine whether ownership structure influences
firms’ behavior, controlling for selection effects. The economics of the supply
of blocks is largely unexplored in the governance literature, perhaps because the
focus has mainly been on partial equilibrium analysis and results (see, however,
Gorton and Kahl (2008) for a recent exception).
Our paper also relates to work in corporate governance that attempts to
address endogeneity problems. Coles, Lemmon, and Wang (2008) and Coles,
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Lemmon, and Meschke (2011) develop structural models of finance and gover-
nance, which on theory can allow econometricians to estimate underlying pa-
rameters. Several papers in this area use natural experiments generated by legal
changes, including Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) (changes in antitakeover
laws) and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2005) (the abolition of foreign majority ownership
regulations in Mexico). Several papers use the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act as an exogenous change (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), Hochberg,
Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009)). See also Hochberg and Lindsey (2010),
who use a labor-based instrument in a corporate finance context, and Kedia and
Rajgopal (2009), who find that option grants vary geographically. In contrast to
these papers, we develop an IV for the incidence of large, private shareholders in
a firm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the role of large share-
holders in the governance of public corporations. Section III describes our data.
Section IV defines the instrument, describes the econometric model that we use
to identify and quantify the impact of blocks on firms, and examines the validity
of the instrument. Section V analyzes the impact of large shareholders on firm
performance and corporate policies using our 2-stage selection model. Section VI
concludes.
II. Large Shareholders and Corporate Governance
A. Monitoring and the Effects of Large Shareholders
Theory suggests that large shareholder monitoring may have a significant im-
pact on several aspects of firm behavior, including a firm’s operating profitability,
corporate investment policy, and choice of financial and executive compensation
policies. In this section we review theories of large shareholders and discuss the
empirical predictions that we test in the remainder of the paper.
Theories regarding beneficial effects of large shareholders typically start by
positing agency problems between owners and managers and by assuming that
large owners are able to reduce these. Due to the size of their stake, they either
have better incentives to monitor or more power to influence decisions than small,
dispersed owners.5
Large shareholders use their influence over firm behavior in several ways.
They may affect operating decisions by monitoring management. This can result
in improved project selection and investment levels, and possibly reduced waste.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that blockholder monitoring restrains managers
from consuming firm resources, thereby improving performance. Also, the pres-
ence of a block may mitigate overinvestment by management and improve the
investment efficiency of the targeted firm (Jensen (1986)). To test these predic-
tions empirically, we examine the impact of large shareholders on measures of
operating performance (e.g., return on assets (ROA)), costs (e.g., selling, general,
and administrative (SG&A) expenses), and investment behavior.
5Some recent theories argue that large shareholders can exert governance even if they do not
intervene in a firm’s operations (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009)).
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Blockholders may also affect firms’ financial policies. Again, the starting
point of the argument is that managers may want to deviate from optimal capi-
tal structures (i.e., optimal in the view of owners). Managers may prefer lower
leverage to reduce firm risk and protect their underdiversified human capital (e.g.,
Fama (1980)). Alternatively, managers may prefer to increase leverage in order to
inflate the voting power of their equity stakes (see Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz
(1988)). In either case, there is a role for large shareholder monitoring related to
capital structure decisions. In terms of payout policy and cash holdings, managers
may prefer lower payouts, as payouts reduce the amount of resources under man-
agement’s control and subject managers to capital markets discipline when the
firm requires external financing (e.g., Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986)). Mon-
itoring by a large shareholder may restrict managers from reducing payouts or
holding too much cash.
Chief executive officer (CEO) pay is perhaps the most obvious potential
source of conflict between management and owners. Whether CEOs are paid ex-
cessively and set their own pay is a question that has been subject to considerable
debate and academic research (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004) for a review
of this work). Because large shareholders may restrain rent extraction by a firm’s
CEO, we examine whether the presence of a block reduces CEO pay.
B. The Costs of Large Shareholders
There are several potential costs of having a large owner. For example, moni-
toring may reduce managerial initiative (e.g., Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi
(1997)). Even when the presence of a block is ex post efficient, in the sense that
the owner will improve investment decisions, the possibility of future interven-
tion may reduce a manager’s ex ante incentive to exert effort and to search for
value-increasing investment opportunities (in the Burkart et al. model, this hap-
pens because the manager will sometimes be overruled by active owners, reducing
his utility). The net effect of concentrated ownership, that is, the benefits of mon-
itoring versus the cost of reduced managerial incentives, is indeterminate. In the
model, the net effect depends on the size of the monitoring shareholder’s stake.
This theory thus predicts that the impact of blockholders on firm financial perfor-
mance is ambiguous.
Another potential cost of large shareholders is reduced liquidity in a firm’s
publicly traded shares. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) suggest that one cause of
stock market illiquidity is the presence of privately informed traders. One such
group of potentially informed traders is blockholders (especially in our sample,
which precedes Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD)). Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)
model how concentrated ownership reduces incentives for information produc-
tion in the stock market by reducing liquidity. Bhide (1993) argues that large
shareholders who reduce agency problems by monitoring management may also
reduce stock liquidity by increasing informational asymmetries. Based on these
theoretical predictions, we test whether blocks have an effect on the liquidity of a
firm’s shares using measures of stock liquidity (e.g., Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
measure).
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Other theories argue that blockholder-liquidity causality might go in the op-
posite direction of the previous arguments. For example, Kahn and Winton (1998)
model the choice to exit or monitor/intervene to improve firm performance and
predict that intervention is less likely when the firm’s stock is more liquid because
of the lower cost of exit. Maug (1998) argues that liquidity may reduce the cost
of creating a block because it makes it less costly to purchase more shares, so
we would expect more blocks in firms with more liquid stocks. Our IV approach
will allow us to test and isolate the causal effect of blocks on liquidity without se-
lection effects confounding the estimates. Several theories explicitly consider the
trade-offs that result from the simultaneous benefits and costs of large sharehold-
ers. For example, Bolton and von Thadden (1998) argue that large shareholders
reduce the threat of takeovers.
III. Data
A. Data on Large Shareholders
We analyze an unbalanced panel of large publicly traded U.S. corporations
from 1996 to 2001. The sample consists of nondual-class Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) 1500 firms and was originally compiled by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gom-
pers, and Metrick (DFGM) (2006), who identify a firm’s 5% blockholders, if
any.6 The raw database contains 1,919 different firms, 18,818 blockholder-firm-
year observations, and approximately 7,600 firm-year observations.7 We exclude
financial firms and utilities, which reduces the sample to approximately 6,000
firm-year observations. Firms are included in our sample whether or not they have
any large shareholders.
We define a large shareholder as a nonmanagerial individual blockholder if
it meets both of the following criteria: First, an individual has the sole voting
power of the block. Second, this individual is neither a current nor a former of-
ficer of the firm (e.g., we exclude Bill Gates’s block in Microsoft). We identify
current and former officers through proxy statements and a Dow Jones Interac-
tive news search. We exclude holdings by current and former officers’ spouses or
trusts (e.g., the Bill and Melinda Gates Trust). We exclude blocks held by 2nd-
generation family members only if a family member is an officer (e.g., the block
by the Hewlett and Packard families is included, as the family has nonexecutive
directorships but none of the family members are officers of Hewlett-Packard).
Our data set contains 715 firm-year observations with at least 1 nonmanagerial
individual blockholder.
6Available from Wharton Research Data Services (http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu). The use of
annual data may underestimate the true number of large shareholders because some blockholders can
enter and exit our panel within a year, thus not showing up in firms’ proxy statements. If some large
shareholders choose to own a stake below the 5% reporting threshold, they also do not show up in the
proxy statements and in the DFGM (2006) database.
7The database has 20,975 blockholder entries. However, not all of these entries are 5% blockhold-
ers. For example, “Karen Smith” and “Peter Smith” are recorded in the raw data, but they jointly hold
shares through the “Smith Family Trust.” Conditioning on the final blockholder flag in the DFGM
(2006) database will eliminate Karen Smith and Peter Smith and retain only the Smith Family Trust.
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B. The Location of Large Shareholders
We obtain data on the geographic location (zip code) of each block in our
sample from firms’ proxy statements. We exclude blocks located abroad. For
some individuals who are officers or directors, the proxy statements do not give an
address, but state “same address as company.” We thus underestimate the actual
distance between the location of some individuals and firm headquarters. Also,
when individuals have multiple residences, we use the one reported in the proxy.
We obtain zip codes of firm headquarters from the ExecuComp database, the
Compact Disclosure discs, or hand-collect them from proxy statements. Finally,
we identify the latitude and longitude of each blockholder and firm by matching
the zip codes to data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip Code
Database.
We compute the distance (in miles) from a blockholder to each of its firms’
headquarters using the methodology of Coval and Moskowitz (1999). Table 1 re-
ports a mean distance of 385.4 miles and a small median distance of 28.5 miles for
nonmanagerial individual blockholders. More than half (61%) are located in the
same state as the firm in which they hold a block. Not surprisingly, the median dis-
tance between blockholder residence and firm headquarters for managerial blocks
is 0, and more than 90% of all managerial large shareholders are located in the
same state as the corporate headquarters. The results are significantly different for
institutional investors. The median distance between mutual fund (money man-
ager) headquarters and the headquarters of the firms in which they own large
stakes is 1,121 miles (871 miles). Less than 10% of all mutual fund and money
manager headquarters are located in the same state as the corporate headquarters
of their block investments.
TABLE 1
Distance between Large Shareholders’ Residence and Firms’ Headquarters
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the distance in miles between the location of a blockholder and the headquarters of
the ﬁrm in which the block is held for 4 different types of large shareholders. The 4 types of blockholders are nonmanagerial
individuals, managers (both current and former), mutual funds, and money managers. The summary statistics are based
on ﬁrm-year observations. If a ﬁrm has multiple blockholders of the same category in a given year, the distance in miles is
calculated as the average distance between ﬁrm headquarters and the locations of the blockholders. Firm-years are only
included in the summary statistics if there is at least 1 blockholder of the respective category. The sample is approximately
6,000 ﬁrm-year observations of nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during the period 1996–2001, excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms and
utilities. Blockholders are entities that own at least 5% of the outstanding shares. The blockholder zip codes are hand-
collected from proxy statements. The ﬁrms’ zip codes come from the ExecuComp database, the Compact Disclosure
discs, or are hand-collected from proxy statements. The distances are calculated for U.S.-based (excluding Alaska and
Hawaii) blockholders only, using latitude and longitude data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip Code
Database. The indicator variable “Same State” is equal to 1 if the blockholder and ﬁrm headquarters are located in the
same state, and 0 otherwise.
Distance in Miles
Type of Blockholder N Mean Median Same State
Nonmanagerial individual 715 385.4 28.5 61.3%
Managers 1,329 52.1 0 93.2%
Mutual funds 4,102 1,158.5 1,121.38 9.5%
Money managers 1,843 1,061.9 871.4 8.6%
C. Geographic Data
Our data for the geographic distribution of high net worth individuals are
from the Statistics of Income (SOI) program at the Internal Revenue Service
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(IRS).8 It reports the number of high net worth individuals in each state, esti-
mated from estate tax return filings. SOI reports estimates of the number of high
net worth individuals by state in 1995, 1998, and 2001 as well as their estimated
average wealth. The definition of high net worth varies somewhat from year to
year. In 1995, it is the net wealth of $0.6 million to $10 million (in terms of
counting the total number of high net worth individuals, the upper cutoff makes
a minor difference). In 1998 and 2001, the lower limit is $1 million and there is
no upper limit. However, the 3 cross sections are very similar. We use 1995 data
because they predate the block observations in our sample, but we have also used
1995 data for 1996–1998 and 1998 data for 1999–2001, as well as 1998 data for
all years, with very small differences in results.
We also collect several control variables that vary at the state level. We ob-
tain education, population, and income data from the Census Bureau. We collect
corporate income tax rates for 2000 (we have used other years as well) from var-
ious sources. When there are multiple brackets we use the rates applying to the
highest income levels.
D. Firm Variables
The theories of large shareholders discussed in Section II predict that large
shareholders can affect a broad set of corporate decisions:
Operating Performance. We analyze ROA and return on sales (ROS). We
also analyze cost-cutting policy (scaled SG&A expenses) and investments
(scaled capital expenditures).
Capital Structure. We analyze measures of book and market leverage.
Resources and Payout Policy. We analyze total payout as a fraction of earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) and cash
holdings.
Managerial Compensation and Board Structure. We analyze the log of total
CEO pay and the fraction of pay in equity. We also analyze the number of
outside directors on the board.
Liquidity. We analyze trading volume and the illiquidity measure of Amihud
(2002).
Our data source for annual accounting variables is Compustat. We exclude
observations with explanatory variables in the top and bottom 1%, but we have
also used winsorizing at the 1% level with very small differences in results. Our
data sources for CEO compensation and board structure are the ExecuComp data-
base and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) director database,
respectively. The data used to calculate the liquidity measures come from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). All variables are defined in
Appendix A.
Table 2 reports summary statistics. Panel A shows that there exists at least 1
nonmanagerial individual block in 11.8% of all firm-year observations. A manager
8For details, see IRS, SOI Bulletin, Winter 2002–2003, Publication 1136 (Rev. 4-2003).
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(either current or former) holds a block in 21.9% of all firm-year observations.
More than 2/3 of all sample observations have at least 1 large mutual fund share-
holder. Panel B reports means, medians, and standard deviations for the variables
we use in Section V.9
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents sample summary statistics. Panel A gives the number of observations and frequency for 4 types of
blockholders: Nonmanagerial individuals, managers (both current and former), mutual funds, and money managers. Panel
B gives mean, median, and standard deviation (SD) for all other variables. The sample size (N) changes across variables,
because of data availability and because outliers are excluded from regressions. All variables are deﬁned in Appendix A.
The sample is nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during the period 1996–2001.
Panel A. Blockholders
Type of Blockholder N Frequency
Nonmanagerial individuals 5,984 0.118
Management 5,984 0.219
Mutual funds 5,984 0.677
Money managers 5,984 0.305
Panel B. Regression Variables
Variables N Mean Median SD
Firm age 5,979 24.000 20.100 19.130
ROA 5,787 0.047 0.055 0.104
ROS 5,784 0.035 0.047 0.166
SG&A 5,318 0.251 0.213 0.179
Investment 5,632 0.282 0.221 0.221
Leverage, BV 5,751 0.252 0.246 0.182
Leverage, long-term only, BV 5,755 0.210 0.195 0.169
Leverage, MV 5,744 0.278 0.220 0.277
Total payout ratio 5,377 0.257 0.202 0.355
Cash holdings 5,771 0.146 0.043 0.270
Number of outsiders on board 5,584 7.440 7.000 2.812
CEO pay (log) 5,092 7.820 7.775 1.188
CEO incentive pay 5,092 0.512 0.553 0.285
Trading volume 5,966 0.006 0.004 0.007
Annualized stock return 5,951 0.054 0.089 0.475
Volatility 5,893 0.450 0.392 0.248
Illiquidity 5,890 0.031 0.004 0.088
IV. Instrument and Empirical Methodology
A. The Instrumental Variable
We define our instrument, the density of high net worth individuals, as the
number of high net worth individuals in 1995 divided by the total number of firms
headquartered in a state, using the 1995 SOI data and information on firm head-
quarters from the Compustat database. Throughout the analysis, we normalize
the measure so that it is measured in units of thousands of individuals per firm
headquarters.
The significant geographic variation in the density of high net worth indi-
viduals is illustrated in Figure 1. States with a large number of high net worth
individuals (e.g., California) will not necessarily have the highest density measure
9The number of blockholders in Table B1 does not correspond to those in Table 1, because Table 1
is the raw database and allows for more than 1 large shareholder per firm-year.
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when a large number of firms are also headquartered in that state. Across states,
the median wealth density is 565 (Oklahoma), and the mean is 664. Of the top 5
states in terms of number of headquarters, California has a density of 442, Texas
299, New York 473, Florida 603, and Massachusetts 270. Across sample firms,
the mean density is 460 individuals per firm and the standard deviation is 151.
FIGURE 1
Geographic Distribution of High Net Worth Individuals
Figure 1 shows estimates of the number of high net worth individuals per Compustat ﬁrm headquarters for each U.S. state.
The wealth data are from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) data, which report the estimated number
of individuals with a high net worth in 1995. The data for ﬁrms’ headquarters are from Compustat in 1995.
B. Estimated Wealth Distributions
Substantial personal wealth is required to buy a 5% or larger stake in one
of the firms in our sample. Our data on high net worth individuals counts many
wealthy people who do not in fact have the resources to buy a 5% stake in most (or
any) listed firms. Is our variable informative about the very top of the wealth dis-
tribution? Also, are there enough wealthy individuals to explain the observed fre-
quency and size of the stakes we classify as individually held? To assess whether
the number and wealth of high net worth individuals are large enough to be consis-
tent with the value of blocks in our sample, we have to extrapolate from wealthy
to very wealthy individuals. The extrapolation, using the power law distribution
of individual wealth, suggests that high net worth individuals have resources that
would allow them, as a group, to hold 5% of public equity in most states. We
provide more details in Appendix B.
C. Two-Stage Selection Model
Most of the existing empirical literature in corporate finance on the economic
effects of large shareholders has estimated an equation of the following form:
yit = γdit + δj(i) + λt + βXit + εit,(1)
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where i and t are indices for firms and years, respectively, and j(i) indicates the
industry to which firm i belongs. Here, yit is a firm performance or corporate
policy variable, δj(i) are industry fixed effects, λt are year fixed effects, Xit is a
vector of time-varying firm-level controls (e.g., the size or age of the firm), and
dit is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a large shareholder is present in firm
i in year t, and 0 otherwise.
It is not possible to draw causal inferences about the effect of blockholders
on firm behavior from estimates of γ in equation (1), because there are economic
reasons to expect that blocks are not randomly allocated to firms. For example,
firm size or growth options are potential determinants of corporate policy choices
and firm performance, but the same variables may also be correlated with the
presence of a large shareholder. If Xit does not include all relevant variables, the
large shareholder indicator variable dit will be correlated with the error term in
equation (1), and OLS estimates of γ will be biased. For example, if the selection
and treatment effects go in opposite directions, γ will be biased toward 0.
To explicitly address this endogeneity problem, we use a 2-stage selection
model, following Heckman and Robb (1985). The model we estimate differs from
standard 2-stage least squares (2SLS) models because of the binary nature of the
endogenous variable of interest (the presence of a block). As in standard 2SLS,
the estimation involves 2 equations. The 1st-stage equation is
d∗it = gwit + aj(i) + ct + bXit + eit,(2)
dit =
{
1, d∗it > 0
0, d∗it ≤ 0 ,
where d∗it is a latent variable, wit is our instrument (i.e., the number of high net
worth individuals per firm headquarters in a state), aj(i) are industry fixed effects,
ct are year fixed effects, and Xit is a vector of firm-level control variables. We
report estimates of the 1st stage using both linear probability models and probit
models.10
In the 2nd stage, firm performance or corporate policies are modeled and it
is assessed how they are affected by the predicted probability of block presence
in a firm. The 2nd-stage equation is
(3) yit = γBLOCK ˆdit + δj(i) + λt + βXit + εit.
Since the only endogenous variable in equation (3) is an indicator variable, this
model is sometimes referred to as a “dummy endogenous variable model”
(Heckman (1978)). The vector of control variables, Xit, is identical to the one
included in the 1st stage. We assume that eit and εit follow a joint normal distribu-
tion with a correlation coefficient of ρ. The model is estimated by maximizing the
joint likelihood function (see also Maddala (1983)).11 The estimated coefficient
γBLOCK captures the treatment effect of a large shareholder on yit.
10Similar model specifications have been estimated recently in the corporate finance literature (see,
e.g., Li and Prabhala (2007)). Our specification with a 1st-stage probit (and a variable in the 1st stage
that is not included in the 2nd stage) is similar to the treatment effects model estimated in Villalonga
and Amit (2006).
11The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) model requires the assumption of joint normality of
the error terms. An alternative approach would be to model the 1st stage as a probit model and then
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If the error terms eit and εit are uncorrelated (ρ = 0), then the effect of large
shareholders on firm performance or corporate policies can be consistently esti-
mated with OLS. If ρ is positive, then the coefficient γ estimated through OLS is
overstated; if ρ is negative, then it will be understated. We test whether ρ is 0 with
a χ2 test that is reported in all tables.
D. Validity of the Instrument
1. Relevancy Condition
The 1st condition for wealth density to be a valid instrument is that it sig-
nificantly predicts the presence of large nonmanagerial individual shareholders in
local firms. There are economic reasons to expect such a relation. First, we found
that blockholders exhibit a preference for firms headquartered near where they
live. Second, we found that there is significant geographic variation in the den-
sity of wealthy individuals. This is important because personal wealth is likely a
key determinant of an individual’s ability to accumulate a large equity stake in a
public firm.
It is important to estimate regressions of block presence on wealth density
with firm- and state-level controls to rule out the possibility that our instrument
is correlated with some firm-level determinant of blocks (e.g., firm size) or state-
level variables (e.g., corporate tax rates). The simplest way to assess the validity
of the relevancy condition is to collapse data by state. Figure 2 plots the frequency
with which firms in a state have a large individual nonmanagement shareholder
against our instrument. Each state is represented by a circle whose area is de-
termined by the number of firms used to calculate the state block frequency.12
States that are large in terms of firms (e.g., California and Texas), appear large
(918 and 649 observations, respectively). On the other hand, South Dakota (the
low outlier just below 1.5 on the x-axis) and Iowa (the high outlier with block fre-
quency around 55%) are small (6 and 40 observations, respectively). The graph
shows an estimated regression line where observations have been weighted by the
number of firms used in calculating the frequency (i.e., the circle sizes). The es-
timated slope is 0.190 (heteroskedasticity-robust standard error of 0.05; t-statistic
of 3.77).
2. Exclusion Restriction
The 2nd condition for our instrument’s validity is that it affects the dependent
variables only through its effect on the endogenous block variable (i.e., wealth
density must not affect the dependent variables directly) and not through any other
mechanism. That is, the correlation between the instrument and the 2nd-stage
use traditional IV techniques where the IV is created from the probit fitted 1st-stage values. We have
also estimated these regressions, and the overall results from the probit-IV regressions are similar in
significance and magnitude to our reported MLE results.
12The block frequency is an average across our sample years to maximize the number of observa-
tions used to calculate the average. Using only the 1996 cross section of blocks and firms increases
the significance and estimated slope.
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FIGURE 2
Frequency of Individual Blocks by U.S. State
Figure 2 plots the frequency of large, individually held, nonmanagerial blocks in each state (across all sample years)
against the density of high net worth individuals in 1995. Each circle represents 1 state. The area of a circle is proportional
to the number of ﬁrms in the state. The solid line represents the regression line from a weighted least squares regression
(weights are the number of ﬁrms). This regression has an estimated intercept of 0.031 (standard error = 0.026), with an
estimated slope of 0.190 (standard error = 0.051). The slope is signiﬁcantly different from 0 at the 0.1% level. The adjusted
R 2 is 0.236.
error term must be 0. The validity of this condition cannot be tested econometri-
cally with only a single instrument, but we provide several supportive empirical
observations and arguments.
One concern may be that areas with wealthy individuals experienced recent
wealth creation (e.g., Microsoft executives in the State of Washington) so that
there is a direct effect of firm performance on wealth density, or potentially re-
verse causality. Three arguments alleviate this concern. Our instrument reflects
“old money” because it is based on inheritance data, and it is not related to con-
temporaneous firm performance and recent IPOs, which reduces concerns of re-
verse causality with firm performance. Also, our block variable does not include
executives (current or former officers), that is, those most likely to have wealth
created in IPOs and through superior firm performance. In addition, we measure
our wealth density instrument with a lag (i.e., prior to our sample period), and
while our instrument is measured at the state level, we examine performance and
policies at the firm level.
Second, while the density of high net worth individuals predicts individual
nonmanagerial blocks, it does not predict the presence of large shareholdings by
either managers or institutional investors. It therefore seems unlikely that our in-
strument measures the “demand for blocks.” If it did, we would expect wealth
density to predict the presence of several different types of blocks, and not only
nonmanagerial individual blocks.
Third, it appears unlikely that location choices of firms and individuals are
motivated by the market for blocks in listed firms. Firm headquarters relocations
are extremely rare events. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) identify only 115 reloca-
tions among more than 5,000 firms between 1992 and 1997. Therefore, firm
locations typically must be determined by early decisions that long predate the
ownership structure in the very large firms in our sample.
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Wealthy individuals are presumably more mobile. Various agglomeration
economies affect location choices (see, e.g., Duranton and Puga (2004) or Glaeser
(2008) and the references therein). Wealthy people likely want to live near other
wealthy individuals for social reasons and because they have correlated tastes.
Such agglomeration seems consistent with the apparent concentration of wealthy
people (New York’s Upper East Side, Aspen, Beverly Hills, East Hampton) and is
not primarily about the production side of the economy, but about the consump-
tion side, because that is where the major externalities are (this is unlike location
choices of the middle class, where productivity externalities may dominate). In
particular, expectations about future policies (e.g., leverage or payout policy)
in local firms are probably less likely to figure much in location decisions of
wealthy individuals. Thus, we do not believe endogenous firm or individual/block
location choices affect our results to a significant extent.
Finally, because we study a very broad set of corporate policies, any theory of
a direct relation between wealth density and a particular policy also has to explain
a large number of relationships (i.e., both the relation between wealth density and
block presence and the relation with all the dependent variables). We are aware of
no economic theory that predicts a direct relation between wealth density and the
multitude of dependent variables that we study.
E. Other Econometric Issues
If IVs are insufficiently correlated with endogenous variables, identification
with IV suffers from a “weak instrument problem” (e.g., Bound, Jaeger, and
Baker (1995), Nelson and Startz (1990), and Staiger and Stock (1997)). Weak
instruments may lead to IV coefficient estimates that are biased toward OLS co-
efficients, and to confidence intervals that are understated. The problem of weak
instruments is serious in settings with a large number of instruments, which are
individually weakly correlated with the endogenous variable(s), but which as a
group are able to explain some of its variation (see, e.g., Angrist, Imbens, and
Krueger (1999)). When the number of instruments is low, however, IV results
neither are particularly biased nor generate excess precision. Given this and the
fact that we use a single instrument, weak instrument bias should not be a concern
in our regressions.13
The impact of large shareholders is likely to vary across firms and owners.
Our results should be interpreted with this in mind. With homogenous effects
(conditional on the control variables), performance and corporate policies will be
similarly affected by a large shareholder across all firms. In that case, the 2nd-
stage large shareholder coefficients that we estimate can be interpreted as the
13Following Staiger and Stock (1997), it is common practice to examine the strength of the instru-
ment in the 1st stage using F-statistics. Based on the cutoff values of Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002)
and Stock and Yogo (2005) and using the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test statistic that allows for
clustered standard errors, we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments in all our reported
1st-stage regressions.
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effect for any firm with a large shareholder, including the majority of firms that
do not actually have such a shareholder. If the homogeneity assumption does not
hold, however, our regressions estimate the average impact of blocks across a
subset of firms that actually have such blocks. Specifically, our estimates reflect
the mean effect for those firms that have a large shareholder because they are
located in states with a high wealth density measure.14 It seems highly likely
that the homogeneity assumption is unwarranted, and that our estimated effects
are local (i.e., they would not generally represent the average effect of blocks
across the universe of firms). The potential impact of a blockholder likely varies
across firms, for example, because other governance mechanisms are in place
in some firms but not others, or simply because some firms are well run and
some less so. Our estimated effects therefore have to be thought of as average
effects for those firms that are marginal targets, that is, neither the most obvious
targets (because those firms have blocks in all states) nor the firms with the lowest
potential impact of a block (because those firms do not have blockholders even
in states with very high wealth density). We estimate average effects across many
policies, so there may be larger effects in a subset of firms with blocks.15 Second,
different blocks are probably formed for different reasons, for example, to force
management to raise leverage, to solidify a commercial relationship, to contain
some agency problem, or to force a change in strategy. We only estimate averages,
so effects of blocks that are infrequent may not be visible with our methodology. If
the effects are in the tails (e.g., blocks reduce excessive leverage but do not affect
nonexcessive leverage), then our specifications may also report small effects (or
none).
V. Results
A. Wealth Density and the Presence of a Large Shareholder in a Firm
We start by reporting results from the 1st-stage regression, in which we pre-
dict the presence of a nonmanagerial individual blockholder in a firm. Table 3
reports several model specifications. We find that the density of wealthy indi-
viduals in a state significantly predicts the presence of a large shareholder in
firms headquartered in that state. In all regressions predicting the presence of
a nonmanagerial block, our IV’s t-statistics are significant at the 1% level. The
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by state. In unreported
regressions, we have clustered standard errors by firm and estimate consistently
smaller standard errors for the instrument.
14For further discussion, see Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996).
15We may miss potential effects of blockholders if heterogeneity leads to effects of opposite signs
(see, e.g., Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009)). If blockholders increase leverage in some firms but
reduce it in others, the estimated net effect might be indistinguishable from 0. While perhaps possible
for leverage, this possibility seems less likely for other variables (e.g., profits or liquidity). In any case,
this suggests that there may be more effects of large shareholders than we identify but does not suggest
ever finding any effects spuriously.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109011000159
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 22:14:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach 923
TABLE 3
First-Stage Results
Table 3 gives results from linear probability models and probit regressions of 3 large shareholder variables on measures
of the density of high net worth individuals in a state in 1995 and controls. The dependent variables are deﬁned as follows.
The large shareholder dummy variable is equal to 1 if an individual nonmanagerial large shareholder is present in the ﬁrm,
and 0 otherwise (columns (1)–(4)). Block ownership is the percentage ownership by individual nonmanagerial blockholders
(column (5)). The managerial block dummy variable is equal to 1 if a large individual managerial shareholder is present in
the ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise (column (6)). The Fund/MM block dummy variable is equal to 1 if a mutual fund or money manager
is present in a ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise (column (7)). The sample is nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during the period 1996–
2001. Blockholders are entities that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix A.
Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Managerial Fund/MM
Block Block Block
Large Shareholder Dummy Ownership Dummy Dummy
Regression Type
OLS Probit Probit Probit OLS Probit Probit
Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Density of high net worth 0.190*** 0.892*** 0.728*** 2.29*** 0.281 –0.291
individuals (1995) (0.060) (0.250) (0.281) (0.560) (0.216) (0.212)
Wealth per listed 0.513***
ﬁrm (1995) (0.174)
Lagged return –0.071 –0.071 –0.129 0.008 –0.116***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.212) (0.036) (0.052)
log(assets, book value) –0.159*** –0.158*** –0.304*** –0.221*** –0.142***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.069) (0.042) (0.027)
Age 0.016* 0.016* 0.057** –0.007 –0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006)
Age2 –0.00021 –0.00020 –0.0008*** –0.0002 0.00008
(0.00013) (0.00013) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007)
Sales growth 0.132* 0.124* 0.182 0.037 0.131**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.315) (0.065) (0.063)
Return on assets (ROA) –0.250 –0.224 –0.903 0.690*** –0.526
(0.309) (0.311) (0.870) (0.215) (0.447)
Year ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.008 N/A N/A N/A 0.026 0.035 N/A
N 5,972 5,972 5,754 5,754 5,754 5,754 5,754
A linear probability model of having a nonmanagerial individual block es-
timated by OLS is reported in column (1) of Table 3. The estimated coefficient
on the density of high net worth individuals, 0.190, implies that a 1-standard-
deviation increase in the instrument (0.420) is predicted to increase the probabil-
ity of having a block by 8.0 percentage points.16 This effect is large compared
to the unconditional mean probability of 11.8%. Because block probabilities are
close to 0 for most firms, the linear probability model may be a poor modeling
choice, and we therefore turn to other model specifications.
In column (2) of Table 3, we estimate probit regressions. Our previous find-
ing that block presence in a firm is significantly predicted by the density of local
16This standard deviation of the instrument is calculated across 50 states. Calculating the standard
deviation across firms yields a lower number (0.151) because few firms are located in the states with
extreme wealth densities. An increase in the density of 0.151 increases the predicted probability of a
block by 2.9 percentage points, according to column (1) of Table 3.
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wealth is robust and does not change across specifications. Around the sam-
ple mean probability of having a block, the effect of increasing the density by
1 standard deviation is to increase the block probability by about 5.4 percentage
points. That is, the magnitude of the effect remains large in this model. In column
(3), time-varying firm-level controls, as well as year and industry-fixed effects, are
included.17 The estimated effect of the instrument is slightly lower, but remains
significant at the 1% level. This regression corresponds closely to the 1st-stage
estimation used to identify the effect of blockholders on a range of dependent
variables discussed later. Size has a negative correlation with block probabilities,
and age and sales growth have positive correlations.
In the remaining columns of Table 3, we report robustness checks and placebo
tests. First, we consider alternative ways of defining the instrument and dependent
variable. In column (4), we replace the numerator of the wealth density measure
(the number of wealthy individuals) with the total wealth held by these individ-
uals, thus incorporating information on the high net worth individuals’ average
wealth (based on data from the 1995 SOI). At the sample mean, a 1-standard-
deviation increase in the wealth per listed firm variable increases the predicted
probability of having a block by 10%. In column (5), the dependent variable is the
percentage of common stock owned by individual shareholders with large blocks,
adding up across blocks if there is more than 1 such block (18% of the firms with
individually held blocks have more than 1 such block, most often 2). Since this
is a continuous variable, the regression is estimated with OLS. The coefficient on
the density variable is highly significant and predicts that a 1-standard-deviation
increase in the instrument results in a 0.96% increase in the average fraction of
shares held by large individuals shareholders (the unconditional average is 1.79%
of shares). We conclude from the tests reported so far that there is a robust effect
of local wealth on individually held blocks in local firms, across various ways of
measuring both wealth and ownership, and controlling for important firm-level
variables.18
It is important for our identification not just that the instrument predicts indi-
vidual blocks, but also that it does not predict the presence of other types of blocks
(some small negative effect is to be expected, since the ownership shares of all
owner categories add up to 1). If it did, we might be concerned that any effects
we identify might reflect those other owners. In column (6) of Table 3, we report
a probit specification with a dummy variable for the presence of a managerial
blockholder as the dependent variable. The coefficient on the instrument is posi-
tive but insignificant. Column (7) shows a negative, but statistically insignificant,
17Industries are based on Fama and French (1997). We have checked that our results are similar
when using 2-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industries.
18As a further robustness check, in unreported regressions, we have used the log of the number
of high net worth individuals and the log of the number of firms as separate independent variables,
or the number of high net worth individuals per capita and the number of firms per capita. Both
variables are always significant of opposite sign and similar magnitudes. An alternative instrument
involves scaling the number of high net worth individuals by the investment opportunity set available
to local blockholders, proxied by the total market capitalization in the state. We used this alternative
instrument, but it produces a less significant 1st-stage result (too weak to be useful in the 2nd stage).
One reason for this could be that the investment opportunities for the individuals we consider are not
local when it comes to investments other than blocks.
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effect of the instrument on the propensity to have a block owned by a mutual fund
or money manager.
There are two important conclusions from Table 3. First, nonmanagerial in-
dividual blocks are not randomly allocated to firms, but economic mechanisms
systematically affect block allocations. For example, large shareholders select
smaller firms with poor past performance, but with significant growth in their
sales. Conditional on firm size, firm age is positively correlated with the presence
of a blockholder in a firm, suggesting that nonmanagerial individuals do not in-
vest in the youngest firms. These are characteristics of firms where the agency
problems between owners and managers may be particularly severe. One inter-
pretation is that the evidence so far is consistent with economic theories of large
shareholders as monitors, and that blocks are systematically allocated to firms
based on where the demand for monitoring is more significant. Our instrument
strongly predicts the presence of a large individual shareholder. Meanwhile, the
placebo tests suggest that our instrument is not identifying a set of firms with more
blockholders in general, but very specifically predicts the presence of individually
held blocks. Other block types are, if anything, less common when there are many
local high net worth individuals.
Second, causal inference regarding the impact of blocks of shares on firms
is not possible from standard econometric models such as equation (1) and OLS.
Because several of the variables that explain the presence of a blockholder in
a firm (e.g., past performance, firm size) can also be expected to play a role
in explaining firm performance and policy choices in the 2nd-stage regressions,
standard models will confound selection and treatment effects of blocks. For
example, we find that large shareholders select firms with relatively poor recent
past performance, but conditional on such selection, we expect blockholders to
improve performance through monitoring of management. This is precisely why
it is important to use an instrument when quantifying the impact of block presence
on firms.
B. State-Level Control Variables
Because the variation in our instrument comes from state-level differences, a
concern is that so far we have captured differences across states that are correlated
with blockholder presence but have nothing to do with the economic explanation
we provide. If a variable is both a determinant of block presence and correlated
with our wealth density measure, our identification is not valid. Therefore, we
reestimate the 1st stage with controls that may be correlated with blocks: popula-
tion density, the state-level corporate tax rate, per capita income, and educational
attainment.
Table 4 shows that none of these state-level control variables significantly
predict the presence of a nonmanagerial individual blockholder in a firm. Also,
the inclusion of state-level control variables does not affect the estimated effect
of our instrument much. Columns (1)–(4) include the state-level controls one by
one. In column (5), which includes all the state-level controls, we find that the
estimated coefficient on wealth density is 0.626 and statistically significant at the
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5% level. That is, measures of economic performance or the quality of the labor
force in a state do not seem to explain our evidence.19
TABLE 4
First-Stage Results with State-Level Controls
Table 4 presents probit regressions of a blockholder indicator variable on the density of high net worth individuals in 1995
and other variables that vary at the state level. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a large individual nonmanagerial
shareholder is present in the ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise. The sample is nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during the period 1996–
2001. The state-level variables are deﬁned in Section III.C. Each speciﬁcation includes the ﬁrm-level controls of column
(3) in Table 3. Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Regression Type (Probit)
Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Density of high net worth individuals 0.709** 0.725*** 0.657** 0.737*** 0.626**
(0.279) (0.281) (0.283) (0.279) (0.2683)
Population density –0.005 –0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
Corporate tax rate (state) 0.011 0.014
(0.014) (0.014)
Per capita income –0.001 –0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Educational attainment 0.003 0.003
(% high school graduates) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,754 5,754 5,754 5,754 5,754
C. Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Large Shareholders
1. Firm Performance
Table 5 reports evidence on the effect of large shareholders on performance.
Column (1) estimates effects for ROA. Age, sales growth, and dividend yield
have positive coefficients, while age squared has a negative coefficient.20 The co-
efficient on the instrumented block indicator variable is 0.037, significant at the
10% level. This implies a predicted 3.7 percentage points higher profitability, all
else being equal, with the presence of a large shareholder in a firm. The mag-
nitude of this effect is large given that the mean ROA is 4.7%. However, the
2nd-stage regression estimates a coefficient for the predicted probability of hav-
ing a large nonmanagerial individual shareholder as opposed to the existence of
a large shareholder. Therefore, the magnitude of the 2nd-stage coefficient mea-
sures the difference between a firm that is predicted to have a large shareholder
19We have also included additional state-level controls: a measure of income inequality, a state
of Delaware incorporation indicator variable, and the G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
as a measure of antitakeover provisions. We have included fixed effects for the 9 Census divisions
(regions). None of the variables significantly predicts block presence in a firm, and none of them
affects the estimated effect of wealth density.
20We include the dividend yield and dividend payer dummy variable in the reported specification
for profitability, following Fama and French (2000). Payout policy is potentially endogenous and
affected by large shareholders. We find that the statistical significance of the block indicator variable
is somewhat stronger if we exclude the dividend variables from the ROA and ROS specifications.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109011000159
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 22:14:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach 927
with certainty and a firm that is predicted with certainty to not have a large share-
holder.21 It is important to note that the relatively large profit effect estimated here
is identified from the marginal firm having a block when our instrument is high,
but not if it were low, and that these firms may see larger improvements from
having a block than the general population of firms. We cannot use the 0.037 co-
efficient to predict that if we added an individual nonmanagerial block to the 88%
of sample firms that do not have such a block, they would experience an average
ROA improvement of 3.7%. This effect is effectively estimated for firms where
there is a marginal block that would have been absent if the firm was in a state
with fewer wealthy individuals.
The estimated correlation coefficient of the error terms in the 1st- and 2nd-
stage equations is negative (–0.250) and statistically significant at the 10% level.
That is, there is a systematic inverse relation between the unexplained (based
on our model in the 1st stage) probability of having a block in a firm and the
unexplained part from our operating performance regression model. An economic
interpretation of this result is that large shareholders tend to target firms with
relatively poor operating performance, holding other firm-level variables constant.
In column (2) of Table 5, we replace ROA with ROS (profits scaled by sales).
The impact of large shareholders is robust and remains positive and significant
(this time at the 1% level). Again, the effect appears economically large.
There are several potential explanations for a positive block impact on prof-
itability and firm cash flows.22 We study two of the most straightforward ones:
cost reduction and investment policy. In column (3) of Table 5, we find that SG&A
expenditures, a measure of cost cutting, do not seem to be significantly affected
by blocks. In column (4), we find that investments (scaled capital expenditures)
of firms are lower by around 7% of assets in the presence of a block, with a co-
efficient significant at the 5% level. This can be compared to mean investment
of 28% of assets. The estimated error term correlation between the 1st- and 2nd-
stage equations is positive, suggesting that large shareholders select firms that
invest more.
The evidence in Table 5 is consistent with theories of large shareholders as
monitors. First, theory predicts that blockholders may monitor and restrain man-
agement from consuming firm resources (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer
and Vishny (1986)), thereby improving ROA and other operating performance
measures. Blockholders target poorly performing firms, but conditional on such
21For a less extreme effect, one may multiply the estimated coefficient with, for example, the
interquartile range of the distribution of predicted probabilities (0.16). For expositional clarity, we
discuss our results in Section V.C as moving from a probability of a large block of 0 to a probability
of a large block of 1.
22It is important to note that we do not develop a unified theory or model from which we can
derive testable implications for all of our empirical tests at once. Hence, while our IV specification
will enable us to determine a causal effect of blockholders on different corporate policies, we will
not be able to say with certainty whether such an effect moves the firm toward a global optimum
(across leverage, payout, etc.). For an alternative approach, see, for example, Coles et al. (2011)
and Coles et al. (2008), who specify models in which optimal firm value and governance (level of
managerial ownership and the proportion of outsiders on the board) are jointly determined by the
relative importance of the productivity parameters of physical assets, managerial/insider effort, and
outside director’s advising/monitoring role in the firm production process.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109011000159
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 22:14:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
928 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
TABLE 5
Operating Performance and Large Shareholders
Table 5 presents results from the 2nd-stage regression of operating performance measures on the instrumented large
shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy variable is equal to 1 if a large individual non-
managerial shareholder is present in the ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise. It is instrumented in the 1st-stage regression with the density
of high net worth individuals in 1995. The last 2 rows of the table show the coefﬁcient and standard error for the density
of high net worth individuals from the 1st-stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy variable on the density
measure and controls. Here, ρˆ is the estimated correlation between 1st- and 2nd-stage error terms. The sample is nondual-
class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during the period 1996–2001. All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Robust standard errors
(shown in parentheses) are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variable
ROA ROS SG&A Investment
Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. 2nd-Stage Results
Large shareholder dummy 0.0371* 0.0782*** –0.0625 –0.0704**
[instrumented] (0.0221) (0.0251) (0.0390) (0.0297)
Age 0.0006* 0.0004 –0.002 –0.0036***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 (/1,000) –0.008* –0.008** 0.00002 0.00004***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Assets, log –0.0024 0.0048* –0.015*** –0.024***
(0.0023) (0.0026) (0.004) (0.0036)
Sales growth 0.0163*** 0.0025 0.010 0.106***
(0.0040) (0.0053) (0.011) (0.027)
Dividend payer dummy 0.0008 –0.002
(0.0040) (0.005)
Dividend yield 0.327*** 0.219***
(0.044) (0.057)
Lagged ROA 0.038 0.372***
(0.039) (0.046)
Lagged return 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.009 0.059***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated ρˆ –0.250 –0.449 0.282 0.184
χ2 test (ρˆ = 0) 3.01* 10.73*** 3.61* 6.83***
N 5,503 5,509 5,172 5,485
Panel B. 1st-Stage Results
Density of high net worth individuals 0.722*** 0.725*** 1.013*** 0.887***
(0.281) (0.257) (0.360) (0.313)
selection, they have a positive impact on profitability.23 We also infer that the
positive effect of blockholder presence in a firm empirically must dominate the
reduction in managerial incentives effect identified by Burkart et al. (1997). One
economic source through which large shareholders seem to systematically affect
firm performance is improved investment efficiency. Blockholders target firms
that invest more than otherwise similar firms, but then the large shareholders work
23Our evidence complements existing evidence on blocks from event studies. For example, Hold-
erness and Sheehan (1985) report that the stock market reacts positively to the announcement of block
presence in a firm by 6 controversial so-called “raiders.” Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987)
study block trades more generally and find that price effects are permanent for buyer-initiated transac-
tions, but temporary for seller-initiated transactions. Barclay and Holderness (1991) study negotiated
block trades (mainly corporate blocks) and find that stock price increases are larger when the new
blockholder achieves control. Slovin and Sushka (1993) find that the sale of a large inside block to an
outside blockholder triggered by the death of an insider leads to positive announcement returns.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109011000159
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 22:14:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach 929
to reduce the overall capital expenditure of these firms by restricting management
from overinvesting (i.e., selecting and investing in projects with lower returns than
their respective cost of capital).
2. Capital Structure
There is a role for large shareholders to monitor leverage choices because
theory predicts that managers may deviate from optimal capital structures because
of underdiversified human capital (e.g., Fama (1980)) or to inflate their control
(e.g., Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988)). Some existing evidence is consistent
with Stulz’s theory that managers take on excessive leverage to increase the voting
power of their equity (e.g., Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997)). The findings by
Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) support the view that agency problems make some
firms issue equity when a debt issuance would have been better for firm value.
Table 6 reports our evidence on blockholder impact for 3 different leverage
measures: book leverage, long-term book leverage, and market leverage. Across
all measures, we find that the coefficient on the instrumented block indicator vari-
able is negative, although only the coefficient for long-term book leverage is sig-
nificant (at the 10% level). This coefficient implies 3.7 percentage points lower
long-term book leverage for firms with a large blockholder, which may be com-
pared to a mean leverage ratio of 21% in our sample. Overall, there is little ev-
idence that blockholder presence influences firms’ capital structures. This is an
average effect, and if some blockholders reduce leverage while others increase
it, the average result might be 0. From a theoretical point of view, this might be
TABLE 6
Capital Structure and Large Shareholders
Table 6 presents results from the 2nd-stage regression of 3measures of leverage on a large shareholder dummy and control
variables. The large shareholder dummy variable is equal to 1 if a large individual nonmanagerial shareholder is present
in the ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise. It is instrumented in the 1st-stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in
1995. The last 2 rows of the table give the coefﬁcient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from
the 1st-stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy variable on the density measure and controls. Here, ρˆ is
the estimated correlation between 1st- and 2nd-stage error terms. The sample is nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during
the period 1996–2001. All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are
clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Long-Term
Leverage, BV Leverage, BV Leverage, MV
Variable Name (1) (2) (3)
Panel A. 2nd-Stage Results
Large shareholder dummy –0.0323 –0.0372* –0.0330
[instrumented] (0.0246) (0.0222) (0.0436)
Controls (1st, 2nd stage) Age, age2, log(assets), sales growth, ROA, dummy for dividend payers,
lagged return
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Estimated ρˆ 0.142 0.138 0.029
χ2 test (ρˆ = 0) 5.42* 5.06** 1.13
N 5,654 5,657 5,555
Panel B. 1st-Stage Results
Density of high net worth individuals 0.692** 0.684** 0.747***
(0.286) (0.284) (0.292)
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plausible, because owners’ risk aversion and lack of diversification might point
to lower leverage, while control motives might favor debt financing over equity
issues. The results are also consistent with the absence of any effect of large share-
holders on capital structure.
3. Resources and Payout Policy
Table 7 reports evidence on the effect of large shareholders on payout pol-
icy and cash holdings. In column (1), we study the total payout ratio (dividends
and repurchases scaled by EBITDA).24 The estimated coefficient on the instru-
mented block indicator is positive and significant. Hence, large shareholders ap-
pear to cause firms to substantially increase their total payout. The effect is large.
A block in a firm is estimated to approximately double the payout ratio compared
to the sample mean. Moreover, the estimated error term correlation between the
1st- and 2nd-stage equations is negative and significant, which suggests that the
blockholders we analyze tend to select firms with low payout ratios compared to
other similar firms. Conditional on selecting these low-payout firms, blockholders
seem to cause a significant increase in the amount paid out to shareholders.25
TABLE 7
Payout Policy, Cash Holdings, and Large Shareholders
Table 7 presents results from the 2nd-stage regression of a measure of payout policy and a measure of cash holdings on
a large shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy variable is equal to 1 if a large individual
nonmanagerial shareholder is present in the ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise. It is instrumented in the 1st-stage regression with the
density of high net worth individuals in 1995. The last 2 rows of the table give the coefﬁcient and standard error for the
density of high net worth individuals from the 1st-stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy variables on the
density measure and controls. Here,ρˆ is the estimated correlation between 1st- and 2nd-stage error terms. The sample is
nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during the period 1996–2001. All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Robust standard
errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Total Payout Ratio Cash Holdings
Variable Name (1) (2)
Panel A. 2nd-Stage Results
Large shareholder dummy 0.265*** –0.0488*
[instrumented] (0.091) (0.0258)
Controls (1st, 2nd stage) Age, age2, log(assets), sales growth,
ROA, lagged return
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Estimated ρˆ –0.336 0.120
χ2 test (ρˆ = 0) 5.58** 2.30
N 5,178 5,461
Panel B. 1st-Stage Results
Density of high net worth individuals 0.624** 0.782***
(0.269) (0.284)
24Scaling the total dollar payout by book value of assets or market value of assets does not change
our conclusions.
25In unreported regressions, we separate payouts through dividends from payouts through repur-
chases and find that the increase in payouts is mostly driven by increases in dividends. One possible
explanation is that dividends are a firmer commitment for management (e.g., Jagannathan, Stephens,
and Weisbach (2000)).
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We next consider block impact on corporate cash holdings. In column (2),
we find that the coefficient on the block indicator is –0.049 (significant at the
10% level). Thus, cash holdings of a firm with a block are smaller by 4.9% of
total assets (sample mean cash holdings are 18%). There is some evidence that
the presence of a large shareholder in a firm reduces cash holdings by about 1/3 of
average holdings.
Theory suggests that managers may prefer larger cash holdings and lower
payout ratios because payouts reduce the amount of resources and assets under
management’s control and potentially subject managers to more capital market
discipline (e.g., Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986)). In analyzing the determi-
nants of corporate cash holdings, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson ((1999),
p. 44) conclude that “management accumulates excess cash if it has the opportu-
nity to do so.” A possible problem with excess cash, as found by Harford (1999),
is that it may allow management to pursue acquisitions that do not increase share-
holder value. Our evidence suggests that blockholder monitoring restrains man-
agers from such resource grabbing.
4. Managerial Compensation and Governance
Table 8 reports evidence on the impact of large shareholders on managerial
compensation contracts and governance structures related to a firm’s board. In col-
umn (1), where the dependent variable is the log of total CEO pay, the coefficient
on the instrumented block indicator variable is –0.96, significant at the 1% level,
implying that CEO pay is reduced by 0.8 standard deviations in the presence of a
TABLE 8
Managerial Compensation, Governance Mechanisms, and Large Shareholders
Table 8 presents results from the 2nd-stage regression of CEO pay and board structure on a large shareholder dummy and
control variables. The large shareholder dummy variable is equal to 1 if a large individual nonmanagerial shareholder is
present in the ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise. It is instrumented in the 1st-stage regression with the density of high net worth individ-
uals in 1995. The last 2 rows of the table give the coefﬁcient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals
from the 1st-stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy variable on the density measure and controls. Here,
ρˆ is the estimated correlation between 1st- and 2nd-stage error terms. The sample is nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during
the period 1996–2001. All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are
clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
No. of Outsiders
CEO Pay (log) CEO Incentive Pay on Board
Variable Name (1) (2) (3)
Panel A. 2nd-Stage Results
Large shareholder dummy –0.960*** –0.446*** 2.112***
[instrumented] (0.192) (0.048) (0.156)
Controls (1st, 2nd stage) Age, age2, log(assets), sales growth, ROA, dummy for dividend payers,
lagged return)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Estimated ρˆ 0.540 0.741 –0.368
χ2 test (ρˆ = 0) 15.76*** 56.14*** 1.83
N 4,936 4,947 5,368
Panel B. 1st-Stage Results
Density of high net worth individuals 0.922*** 0.620** 0.480***
(0.308) (0.278) (0.174)
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blockholder, which for the typical CEO corresponds to about $1.5 million an-
nually in lower pay. The estimated error term correlation between the 1st- and
2nd-stage equations is positive (0.540) and significant at the 1% level, suggesting
that large shareholders seem to target firms with more generous executive pay
packages compared to those of otherwise similar firms.26
This large effect of blockholders seems consistent with the joint hypothe-
ses that CEOs extract rents through compensation (e.g., Holderness and Sheehan
(1985), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), and Bebchuk and Fried (2004)), and
that blockholder monitoring can mitigate or eliminate such agency problems.
Note that firm heterogeneity may be important, for example, if shareholders target
poorly managed firms. We cannot infer that firms without blockholders would
respond with drastic pay reductions if a blockholder appeared.
We next analyze the composition of pay. In column (2) of Table 8, we find
that incentive pay is a significantly smaller fraction of total compensation by 0.446
with a blockholder present in the firm. The reduction in total CEO pay because of
large shareholder presence is almost all in terms of the incentive pay component.
Many CEOs of large U.S. public firms receive $1M in cash pay for tax reasons,
which may induce a mechanical relation between incentive pay and pay levels
(incentive compensation is a lower fraction of the total pay package for CEOs
with lower total compensation). This could explain our finding. Alternatively, the
evidence of less incentive pay in a firm with a blockholder is consistent with
substitution of different governance mechanisms. Firms with a large shareholder
as a monitor do not require as much pay-for-performance sensitivity to align the
interests of owners and management as do firms with no block.
We also analyze the impact of large shareholders on a firm’s board composi-
tion. A seat on the board may provide a blockholder with nonpublic information
about the firm as well as opportunities to influence firm decisions. In column
(3) of Table 8, where the dependent variable is the number of outside directors
of the firm, the coefficient on the block indicator variable is 2.1, significant at
the 1% level. A block increases the number of outside directors by 2, which
may be compared to the mean number of outsiders of 7.44 among the firms in
our sample.27 This evidence suggests that large shareholders monitor firms by ei-
ther serving on the board of directors themselves or by supporting other outside
directors.28
26Whatever selection bias affects OLS results would seem unlikely to cloud these large estimated
effects of blocks on CEO pay. Indeed, CEO pay is one of the few variables where OLS results are
significant in the same direction as our IV results (this is consistent with findings in Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) that blockholders reduce CEO pay). See Table 10 for a systematic comparison of
OLS and IV estimates.
27Outside directors are often thought of as positive from a governance perspective (see, e.g., Rosen-
stein and Wyatt (1990), who report significantly positive share-price reactions surrounding outside di-
rector appointments). But researchers have not found much significant evidence of an effect of outside
directors on longer-term firm performance measures (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat
and Black (2002)), possibly because of the endogeneity of board composition (e.g., Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998)).
28Overall board size increases as well (not reported). As a consequence, when using the fraction of
outside directors as the dependent variable, the individual nonmanagerial large shareholder variable is
statistically insignificant.
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5. Liquidity and Risk
Theory suggests that a potential cost of a large shareholder in a firm is
reduced liquidity in the firm’s publicly traded shares (e.g., Holmstrom and Ti-
role (1993), Bolton and von Thadden (1998)). Table 9 reports our evidence for
3 variables: trading volume, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, and share price
volatility. We find that a large shareholder in a firm causes the firm’s shares to see
lower trading volume, have lower volatility, and be less liquid. These effects are
significant at the 1% level, and the magnitudes are large. For example, for the
trading volume regression in column (1), the estimated regression coefficient on
the instrumented block indicator is –0.004, implying that the presence of a block-
holder causes a decline in trading volume by 0.6 standard deviations. The evi-
dence of lower trading volume may suggest that large shareholders mechanically
reduce liquidity by keeping shares off the stock market, shrinking the float, and
lowering noise trading. However, the likely drop in float is much smaller than the
estimated drop in trading volume. A possible additional source of lower volume
(and higher illiquidity) is the presence of privately informed traders. This result
supports theoretical predictions by, for example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and
Bhide (1993). They argue that large shareholders who reduce agency problems by
monitoring management may also reduce stock liquidity by increasing informa-
tional asymmetries. In the context of liquidity, our empirical evidence suggests
that the cost of the presence of a large shareholder significantly outweighs any
potential benefits for small shareholders.
The evidence also indirectly supports theories arguing that stock market liq-
uidity may reduce the cost of creating a block (e.g., Maug (1998)). The estimated
error term correlation between the 1st- and 2nd-stage equations in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 9 are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that large sharehold-
ers target firms whose stocks are more liquid compared to those of other firms.
Because these selection effects are strong, it is important to take them into ac-
count when empirically analyzing block impact on liquidity.29 The block effects
on stock liquidity highlight that there are costs of large shareholders that accom-
pany the benefits of improved monitoring of management and reduction of agency
problems.
Column (3) of Table 9 suggests that stock price volatility falls when a firm
has an individual nonmanagerial block, although the effect is less dramatic than
the volume and liquidity effects. A block is predicted to reduce annual volatil-
ity by 7.5%, which is a little less than 1/5 of average and median values. This is
consistent with large shareholders influencing corporate policies in a conservative
direction.
D. Robustness Checks and Additional Tests
We have performed several robustness checks. One concern is that the sig-
nificance of our instrument is driven by a few states with the most extreme wealth
29In Table 10, we discuss comparisons of OLS and instrumental coefficient estimates. Only for 1
of these dependent variables (trading volume) is the OLS coefficient significant and of the same sign
as the IV estimate, and in that case it is much smaller. This is an indication of the selection effects.
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TABLE 9
Liquidity and Large Shareholders
Table 9 presents results from the 2nd-stage regression of measures of liquidity on a large shareholder dummy and control
variables. The large shareholder dummy variable is equal to 1 if a large individual nonmanagerial shareholder is present
in the ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise. It is instrumented in the 1st-stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in
1995. The last 2 rows of the table give the coefﬁcient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from
the 1st-stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy variable on the density measure and controls. Here, ρˆ is
the estimated correlation between 1st- and 2nd-stage error terms. The sample is nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms during
the period 1996–2001. All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are
clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Trading Volume Illiquidity Stock Price Volatility
Variable Name (1) (2) (3)
Panel A. 2nd-Stage Results
Large shareholder dummy –0.0039*** 0.124*** –0.075***
[instrumented] (0.0009) (0.017) (0.028)
Controls (1st, 2nd stage) Age, age2, log(assets), sales growth, lagged return, ROA, dummy for
dividend payers, institutional block ownership, dummy of NASDAQ
membership, average share price
Other controls Volatility Trading volume Volatility, Trading volume
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Estimated ρˆ 0.364 –0.667 0.290
χ2 test (ρˆ = 0) 145.11*** 22.09*** 11.15***
N 5,636 5,633 5,614
Panel B. 1st-Stage Results
Density of high net worth individuals 0.824*** 0.388* 0.578**
(0.277) (0.218) (0.273)
densities. This is not the case, because we find that dropping the 10 states with the
highest or lowest wealth density has little effect on the economic and statistical
significance of our results. The same is true if we drop the 10 states with the lowest
number of firm headquarters. A related concern is that New York City is driving
our results. Many wealthy individuals may consider New York City an attractive
city to live in, and at the same time, hold blocks in one of the many firms in New
York. When we exclude New York City, we find that the economic and statistical
significance of the estimated 1st-stage coefficient of the instrument increases.
The block indicator may be proxying for nonlinear firm size effects. When
we add [log(assets)]2 and [log(assets)]3 in the regressions, as well as alternative
measures of size such as the log of market value and the log of sales, our results
do not change (for predicting blockholders, higher powers of size tend not to
be significant). Also, individual and institutional blocks may be substitutes. We
have added an indicator variable for the presence of a large mutual fund, money
manager, or other institutional owner as a control, but it does not affect any of our
results.
We also developed a potential alternative instrument using income data,
which are available for a finer geographic segmentation than the state level. The
Census Bureau reports data on aggregate capital income (interest, distributions,
dividends, and capital gains) by location. We collected the mean of such income
in 1995, in current dollars for each MSA, divided by the number of locally head-
quartered Compustat firms. This ratio is available for 5,242 of our approximately
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6,000 firm-year observations.30 We conjecture that high local capital income pre-
dicts the presence of blocks in local firms. Using the log of this ratio in the 1st
stage as an alternative instrument works well. However, when both instruments
are included in the 1st stage, the MSA-based instrument candidate is not statisti-
cally significant, rendering it inappropriate as an additional instrument.
We have also used as an additional instrument the average wealth density
in neighboring states. The idea is that if there are more wealthy individuals in a
neighboring state, it may influence the effective supply of blockholders, though
probably less so than the presence of in-state wealthy individuals. We calculated
a straight average across the neighboring states, giving equal weight to all states
(and dropping Alaskan and Hawaiian observations). This variable is too weakly
correlated with blocks to be a useful variable on its own. In a simple OLS regres-
sion of the block dummy variable on the wealth instrument (as in column (1) of
Table 3) and a simple average of the instrument across neighboring states, the
coefficients are 0.197 (0.007) and –0.005 (0.03), respectively.
We have implemented an overidentification test using either the MSA
instrument or the neighboring states instrument. The overidentification test does
not reject with either additional instrument. However, neither the wealth den-
sity in neighboring states nor the MSA instrument is sufficiently correlated with
the block variable to make the results of the over identification tests meaningful.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results for different classifications
of large nonmanagerial, individual shareholders. Second-generation family mem-
bers who are not current or former officers are included in our measure, but we
find that excluding these blocks does not materially affect our results. Also, some
blockholders who are directors do not provide their private address in firms’
proxy statements but report “same address as company.” Excluding these does
not change any of our results, although significance is sometimes slightly reduced.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
We develop and test a new IV framework that allows us to separate selection
effects from treatment effects for a large group of blockholders and to quantify
their impact on several aspects of firm behavior. We start by documenting that
nonmanagerial individual shareholders hold blocks in firms that are headquartered
close to where they live. We then use this empirical fact to create an IV (the
geographic variation in the density of wealthy individuals) for the presence of
a large shareholder in a publicly traded U.S. firm. This instrument predicts the
presence of a block in a firm with surprising power, and it is robust to the inclusion
of variables that vary geographically, reducing concerns about its validity.
Our evidence contributes in 3 ways to existing research on blockholders and
more generally to corporate governance research. First, we find that blocks are not
randomly allocated to firms but are systematically allocated based on where the
benefits to additional monitoring are more significant. This result confirms a sus-
picion about block ownership endogeneity that researchers have had at least since
Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Importantly, the nonrandomness of blocks matters.
30We lose observations because a fraction of firms are headquartered outside MSAs.
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The inferences about the impact of large shareholders change significantly once
we control for selection effects. Table 10 summarizes this result by showing that
OLS estimates of blockholder effects combine selection and treatment effects.
For example, while ROS is positively affected by a block according to our IV
estimates, the OLS estimate is negative and insignificant. We infer that blocks are
more likely in firms with otherwise low profitability, but that the presence of a
blockholder tends to raise profits (back toward the mean).
TABLE 10
Comparison of Instrumental Variable and OLS Estimates
Table 10 compares instrumental variable (IV) and OLS estimates of nonmanagerial individual blockholder effects on ﬁrms.
Each reported number corresponds to a separately estimated coefﬁcient on the large shareholder dummy variable for the
different dependent variables. We use the same control variables in each regression as in Tables 5–9. The IV column gives
the estimated 2nd-stage coefﬁcients on the instrumented large nonmanagerial individual shareholder dummy variable.
It is instrumented with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995. The OLS column gives the corresponding OLS
estimate of the large nonmanagerial individual shareholder dummy variable. All variables are deﬁned in Appendix A.
Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Blockholder Coefﬁcient
Dependent Variable IV OLS
ROA 0.0371* 0.0138
ROS 0.0782*** –0.0021
SG&A –0.0625 0.0082
Investment –0.0704* –0.0071
Leverage, BV –0.0323 0.0094
Long-term leverage, BV –0.0372* –0.0014
Leverage, MV –0.0330 0.0008
Total payout ratio 0.265*** 0.058**
Cash holdings –0.0488* –0.0160*
CEO pay (log) –0.960*** –0.193***
CEO incentive pay (log) –0.446*** –0.049***
Number of outside directors 2.112*** 0.017
Trading volume –0.0039*** –0.0014***
Volatility –0.075*** 0.0072
Illiquidity 0.124** 0.0014
After controlling for block selection effects, we find that large shareholders
affect a broad set of firm policies in addition to performance. The presence of a
large shareholder reduces the firm’s investments, reduces corporate cash holdings,
increases payouts to shareholders, and reduces total top-executive pay. These re-
sults are economically and statistically significant. Firms with blockholders are
also found to have more outside directors on their boards. Many theories predict
that large shareholders mitigate agency problems between managers and own-
ers by monitoring management, but our paper is the first to show that blocks
cause changes in firm behavior that are consistent with theories of blockholders as
monitors.
Finally, we find that large shareholders come with costs as well as bene-
fits. While large shareholders improve firm performance through monitoring, we
also find costs of their presence to other shareholders. One cost is a less liq-
uid publicly traded stock because of a smaller float and because the presence of
privately informed blockholders, who might sell, increases informational asym-
metries and as a result increases illiquidity, consistent with theoretical predictions
(e.g., Bhide (1993)).
We want to recognize some limitations of our analysis. We have sidestepped
the issue of how large shareholders other than individuals (e.g., institutions) affect
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corporate performance and policies, because our instrument is not expected to
(and does not) predict the presence of such owners. It is perhaps even more chal-
lenging to identify a valid instrument for the presence of institutional investors
than for individual nonmanagement blocks. Also, we have not analyzed interac-
tions of individual blocks with other governance mechanisms because testable
predictions have not been worked out theoretically (see Zwiebel (1995) for an
exception), and we are concerned about reintroducing endogeneity issues in the
analysis. In addition, our empirical framework does not separate the effect of
the presence of a large shareholder from the threat of future block presence in a
firm. As suggested by Manne (1965), the threat of actions by blockholders can
influence managerial behavior, and if firms in high wealth density areas face a
higher threat of block creation, this may partly explain our results. Finally, in the
absence of a unified structural model from which theoretical predictions can be
derived and tested, we cannot say with certainty whether the levels of, for exam-
ple, payout and investment in firms with blockholders are closer to the optimal
levels that would prevail in a frictionless financial system.
Appendix A. Variable Definitions
ASSETS (log): Log of total assets (Compustat item 6).
AVERAGE SHARE PRICE: Mean daily closing share price previous year.
CASH HOLDINGS: Cash and short-term investments (item 1) ÷ lagged net property,
plant, and equipment (item 8).
CEO INCENTIVE PAY: Fraction of total CEO pay (ExecuComp item TDC1) that is paid
in either stock or options.
CEO PAY (log): Log of the sum of cash salary, cash bonus, and the Black and Scholes
(1973) value of options granted during a fiscal year to the CEO (ExecuComp item
TDC1).
DIVIDEND YIELD: Ratio of the sum of common dividends (item 21) and preferred
dividends (item 19) over book value of common equity (item 60).
DIVIDEND PAYER: Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the sum of common dividends
(item 21) and preferred dividends (item 19) > 0, and 0 otherwise.
FIRM AGE: Log of months since first listing on stock exchange.
ILLIQUIDITY: Yearly average of absolute daily return ÷ daily dollar volume, as calcu-
lated by Amihud (2002). Data come from CRSP.
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS: The 10 Fama and French (1997) industries, FF10.
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK OWNERSHIP: Aggregate ownership by institutions, count-
ing only blocks of 5% or more of common equity.
INVESTMENT: Capital expenditures (item 128)÷ lagged net property, plant, and equip-
ment (item 8).
LAGGED RETURN: Stock market return over the previous fiscal year.
LEVERAGE, BV: Leverage long-term debt (item 9) + current liabilities (item 34) ÷
long-term debt + current liabilities + book value of common equity (item 60).
LEVERAGE, LONG-TERM ONLY, BV: Leverage long-term debt (item 9) ÷ long-term
debt + book value of common equity (item 60).
LEVERAGE, MV: Leverage long-term debt (item 9) + current liabilities (item 34) ÷
long-term debt + current liabilities + market value of common equity.
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MARKET CAPITALIZATION: Number of shares outstanding × calendar year closing
price (item 25 × item 199).
NASDAQ LISTING: Dummy variable equal to 1 for firms listed on NASDAQ, and 0
otherwise.
NUMBER OF OUTSIDERS ON BOARD: Number of nonaffiliated directors on firm’s
board, from the IRRC director database.
PAYOUT RATIO: Common dividends (item 21) + dollar expenditures on the purchase of
common and preferred stock (item 115) − the reduction in the value of the net number
of preferred shares outstanding (changes in item 56) ÷ EBITDA.
RETURN ON ASSETS: Ratio of EBITDA (item 18) ÷ lagged total assets (item 6).
RETURN ON SALES: Ratio of EBITDA (item 18) ÷ lagged total sales (item 12).
SALES GROWTH: Net sales (item 12) ÷ lagged net sales, minus 1.
SG&A: Selling, general, and administrative expenses (item 189) ÷ sales (item 12).
TRADING VOLUME: Yearly average of number of shares traded per month ÷ total
shares outstanding.
VOLATILITY: Annualized standard deviation of monthly share price, calculated over
previous 24 months.
Appendix B. Wealth Levels Relative to Blockholdings
In Appendix B we consider the resources of high net worth individuals, relative to the
size of the equity blockholdings we study (see Section IV.B). We use the fact that empirical
wealth distributions closely follow a power law, at least for the top 5%–10% of individuals
by wealth (e.g., Levy and Solomon (LS) (1997), Klass, Biham, Levy, Malcai, and Solomon
(2006)). Such a power law implies a particular relationship between the wealth rank of an
individual and her wealth. Using this empirical fact, we may estimate the number of people
of any particular wealth level (as long as it is in the top 5%–10% of individuals) using the
number of people above the cutoff for the SOI wealth data.
We use the power law parameter of 1.36, as estimated by LS (1997), to estimate the
top of the wealth distribution.31 We infer the number and wealth of the very wealthiest in-
dividuals for each state in 1998. Table B1 presents our estimates of the wealth distributions
for Oregon (with the median number of millionaires: 27,000), Georgia (75th percentile:
64,000), New York (2nd highest: 243,000), and California (highest: 412,000). In these
4 states, the estimated wealth of the 100 richest individuals was $17.4 billion, $32.8 billion,
$87.4 billion, and $128.8 billion, respectively. The estimated number of ultrawealthy indi-
viduals (with more than $100 million in personal wealth) is 51 in Oregon, 122 in Georgia,
463 in New York, and 785 in California. The table also reports the number of sample firms
in each state, the total market value of equity of these firms, and the median, average, and
largest firm market values in 1999. Five percent of the median firm’s market value across
the 4 states is $43 million, $70 million, $171 million, and $58 million, respectively, and
there are an estimated 162, 198, 223, and 1,659 individuals with enough estimated wealth
to buy such a stake if they invested all their wealth. These estimates suggest that there
is enough money in the hands of the wealthiest individuals for them to potentially play a
significant role as owners of large blocks of shares.
The estimates in Table B1 depend on the accuracy of the power law distribution.
The following exercise shows that an extrapolation using the power law distribution works
remarkably well and that the variable we use tracks the whole top of the wealth distribu-
tion, including its far tail. Forbes publishes an annual list of the wealthiest Americans and
31LS (1997) use data from the 1996 Forbes 400 list of the richest people in the U.S. to back out
the parameter of 1.36. Klass et al. (2006) calculate an average parameter of 1.49 using the Forbes 400
lists during 1988–2003. We use the 1996 parameter, as it predates our sample.
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TABLE B1
Estimated Wealth Distributions
Table B1 presents estimates of the number and wealth of high net worth individuals for 4 U.S. states (Oregon, Georgia,
New York, and California). The wealth estimates are based on data from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income
(SOI) data, which report the estimated number of individuals with a high net worth ($1M and up) in 1998. The wealth of
subsamples of these individuals (100 richest, number with $100 million or more in net wealth) is estimated assuming
individual net wealth follows a power law distribution with Wn = A × n−1/1.36 for wealth W and individual rank n, where
A is a constant. The parameter of 1.36 is estimated by Levy and Solomon (LS) (1997). The 1999 end-of-year market value
and number of listed ﬁrms are constructed from Compustat data. The sample is nondual-class S&P 1500 ﬁrms.
Variable Name Oregon Georgia New York California Data Source
No. of individuals with high net worth 27,000 64,000 243,000 412,000 SOI (1995)
Wealth of 100 richest individuals ($M) 17,367 32,759 87,373 128,817 Estimate using LS (1997)
Their wealth as fraction of state 140% 8% 5% 9%
market value 1999
No. of individuals with $100M in wealth 51 122 463 785 Estimate using LS (1997)
Their wealth as fraction of state 110% 9% 8% 18%
market value 1999
No. of sample ﬁrms in state (1999) 7 26 70 153 Compustat
Total market value of equity in 1999 ($M) 12,420 392,538 1,827,770 1,420,483 Compustat
Median market value in 1999 × 5% ($M) 43 70 171 58 Compustat
Average market value in 1999 × 5% ($M) 89 755 1,015 597 Compustat
Largest market value in 1999 × 5% ($M) 259 7,200 17,500 9,700 Compustat
No. of individuals with enough wealth to buy 5% of: Estimates using LS (1997)
Median ﬁrm in state 162 198 223 1,659
Average ﬁrm in state 61 8 20 69
2nd largest ﬁrm in state 27 0.6 0.6 1.9
Largest ﬁrm in state 14.1 0.4 0.4 1.6
their principal residences. The minimum wealth required to make the 1998 list was $430
million. We count the number of high net worth individuals in each state. We then use the
power law and the SOI data to predict, for each state, the number of individuals with wealth
greater than $430 million. Finally, we compare our estimates to the actual number of ultra-
wealthy individuals. Figure B1 plots the actual against the predicted number of individuals
with more than $430 million in each state. The correlation coefficient is 0.89 and highly
statistically significant. Thus, the power law distribution can be used to accurately predict
the geographic distribution of ultrawealthy individuals using the distribution of moderately
wealthy individuals.
FIGURE B1
Actual versus Predicted Number of Individuals on the Forbes 400 List
Figure B1 plots state by state, the actual number of individuals on the Forbes list of the wealthiest Americans (in 1998)
against the predicted number of individuals. We use the wealth data from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of
Income (SOI) database (1998) and the power law distribution with a parameter of 1.36 estimated by Levy and Solomon
(1997) to predict the number of individuals on the list (minimum wealth required to be on the Forbes 1998 list was $430
million). The correlation coefﬁcient between actual and predicted number of ultrawealthy individuals is 0.89.
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